


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4 June 1965



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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE  
RELATING TO NATIONAL SECURITY



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State Dept. review completed

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
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Dominican Republic: Rebels intensify psychological offensive against Imbert government. (Page 1)

2. Vietnam: Current situation report. (Page 3)

25X1




4. Malaysia: Tensions between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur rising to a new high. (Page 7)

5. Trucial States: Four states are considering terminating their special relationships with London. (Page 8)

6. France-NATO: De Gaulle apparently plans some sudden move against NATO after December's presidential election. (Page 9)

25X6



9. Notes: Kenya; Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia; Yugoslavia; Japan; [redacted]

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

4 June 1965

\*Dominican Republic: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT) The rebels are intensifying their psychological offensive against the Imbert government.

Rebel news media continue to report alleged cease fire violations and atrocities committed by US and Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) forces. The rebels also persist in provoking US troops in Santo Domingo and GNR forces in the interior.

On the night of 2 June US troops east of the Ozama River were subjected to heavy fire from the rebel-held Ciudad Nueva area. On the same night, rebels attacked a police post and an army barracks in the southwestern town of San Juan de la Maguana; both attacks were successfully repulsed. The latter incident points out the capability of the rebels--and especially of the Communists--to cause trouble in many Dominican towns. This capability can be expected to increase so long as the political stalemate in the capital is unresolved.

The apparent rebel objective is to present a picture of continuing unrest to discredit the GNR and its claim to full control of the country. They are also attempting to demonstrate that they are a dedicated group of patriots who are being besieged by "repressive" forces. The lack of initiative and effort by the GNR in fighting these charges is giving the rebels a measure of success. The GNR attitude in this regard is due in part to the conviction of many--especially the chiefs of staff--that nothing short of direct military action can solve the situation.

Another rebel ploy has been to publicize an alleged split within the loyalist ranks. According to the rebel

claim, loyalist military officers are plotting to overthrow Imbert and renew the military campaign. The US Embassy reports, however, that it has no evidence that would support either of these allegations.

Meanwhile, the downtown rebel-held area remains a well-armed camp with few noncombatants in sight. Food is in short supply and the central market is reported to be empty. [REDACTED]

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
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[REDACTED] free US-distributed foodstuffs comprise the main supply for the rebel forces.

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[REDACTED]

# NORTH VIETNAM



\*Vietnam: (Information as of 4:30 AM EDT)


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Air Strikes in North Vietnam: On 3 June US strike aircraft inflicted heavy damage on the Ben Quang army barracks near the DMZ. Many of the buildings were reported either destroyed or severely damaged.

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4 June 65

3





US armed reconnaissance missions over Route 7 and the coastal area between the 19th and 20th parallels destroyed or damaged a number of targets, including six trucks, a road grader, a camouflaged boat, and various communications and transport facilities. Pilots reported frequently sighting animal-drawn cart traffic on Route 116 heading northwest toward the Laotian border.

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Political Developments in South Vietnam: The political crisis in Saigon appears to be deepening. Intensive lobbying by Premier Quat's opponents has undercut his majority among members of the National Legislative Council and apparently removed that body as an avenue toward a solution favorable to the premier. Meanwhile, a series of conferences yesterday between Quat, Chief of State Suu, and top military leaders ended inconclusively. [The generals who participated in these discussions, while still trying to assume a mediating role, displayed evident impatience with the continued squabbling among civilian politicians.]

The Military Situation in South Vietnam: In widely separated actions yesterday, the Viet Cong inflicted heavy casualties in ambushes in the central highlands and raided a town only 10 miles from Saigon. In the highlands province of Phu Bon, a government battalion on a road clearing mission was ambushed twice by a Communist force estimated at two companies. The government unit was dispersed, with at least 50 killed or wounded and only about 30 others safely accounted for.

In Gia Dinh Province which surrounds Saigon, an estimated Viet Cong battalion attacked the district

(continued)

4 June 65

4

town of Binh Chanh on the main route leading to the delta. A nearby outpost was overrun, with 30 paramilitary defenders listed as missing. The Viet Cong were ultimately driven from the area by US helicopter strikes.

In other actions, government forces in the central highland province of Pleiku recovered a district town that had been overrun by the Communists on 1 June, and in the delta province of Bac Lieu they killed some 40 guerrillas during a search and destroy operation. US marines tangled briefly with the Viet Cong south of Da Nang on the night of 2-3 June, killing about 20 with no US losses.

Air Clash on 4 June: Two US Navy F4 aircraft were attacked by four Communist MIG-17 jet fighters about 50 miles southwest of Hanoi at about 0700 hours local Vietnam time today. According to initial US pilot reports, the Communist MIGs broke off after about a four minute engagement in which both sides attempted firing passes. There was no apparent damage to either side. The US aircraft involved in this clash were flying protective cover for air search and rescue operations under way in northern Laos at the time of the attack.

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Malaysia: Tensions between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur seem to be rising to a new high.

In a recent series of inflammatory speeches and statements, Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew has angered the Malay-dominated central government by aggressively pushing his concept of a noncommunal Malaysia. The Malay leadership in Kuala Lumpur is especially aroused by Lee's assertion that Malays have no more right than any other people to consider themselves the indigenous race of the Malayan peninsula.


Relations between Singapore and the central government have been stormy ever since the formation of Malaysia in September 1963. Lee's predominantly Chinese Peoples Action Party has opposed Malay political hegemony on the national level, and despite active opposition from Kuala Lumpur, has been trying to build an organization outside Singapore. Since early this year strong Malay ultranationalist elements have been pressing the central government to reduce Singapore's status within the federation and arrest Lee.

Lee apparently hopes to force the leadership to disown and isolate the ultranationalists. On 30 May Lee publicly warned that Malaysia might break up if their influence prevails.

Lee's new wave of attacks on the existing political order may boomerang. Vigorous propaganda and political counterattacks from Kuala Lumpur are almost certain and could lead to new outbreaks of communal violence in Singapore.

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## PERSIAN GULF AREA



Trucial States: [Four of the British-protected Trucial States are considering terminating their special relationships with London.]

[According to the British Foreign Office the ruling sheikhs of Sharjah, Ras al Khaimah, Fujairah, and Ajman still wish to deal directly with the Arab League on aid matters, despite London's adamant opposition.]

[The four are said to be meeting almost daily to discuss three possible moves: unilateral renunciation of the treaties which grant Britain control of their foreign affairs, request for protection from Egypt, and acceptance of arms from the Soviet Union. The British report that the Soviet ambassador in Kuwait has offered arms through Egyptian channels.]

[The British apparently still hope that the lure of their \$2.8 million aid offer, together with a similar one from Saudi Arabia, will deter the sheikhs from any rash action.]

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4 June 65

8

France-NATO: [Some French officials believe that De Gaulle plans some sudden moves against NATO after the French presidential election in December.]

[A French Foreign Ministry official has indicated that De Gaulle has advanced his schedule in dealing with NATO, but still wants to avoid a major pre-election confrontation. Indications have been accumulating in recent weeks that De Gaulle will not withhold his move against NATO until 1969, when formal withdrawal from the treaty becomes possible. His intention, however, had reportedly been a piecemeal whittling away of the NATO structure, rather than the abrupt attack he is now said to envisage.]

[The desire to avoid a pre-election showdown is evident in the reaction of the Gaullist newspaper Nation to Secretary McNamara's nuclear-committee proposal. The paper emphasized that Defense Minister Messmer's agreement to give the proposal serious study indicates that France is not necessarily "against everything coming from Washington." The non-Gaullist press is doubtful, however, that France will ultimately participate.]

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NOTES

Kenya: [In announcing yesterday that he was canceling the appointment of Vice President Oginga Odinga to head Kenya's delegation to the mid-June Commonwealth Conference in London, Kenyatta has taken a further move against his pro-Communist deputy. This is his first open expression of distrust in Odinga, and sets the stage for a motion of no confidence in Odinga which moderates plan to present in parliament this week end. Kenyatta's action followed vitriolic public exchanges between Odinga and the moderates, and was in response to a petition from 12 cabinet members.]

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Czechoslovakia-Yugoslavia: Czech party boss Novotny is continuing his efforts to improve his image at home and portray his party as a flexible force in the international Communist movement. Tito's first visit to Communist Czechoslovakia, now in progress, reflects the change which has taken place in the Czech outlook toward Yugoslavia. Tito is receiving the kind of favorable coverage in Czechoslovakia normally reserved for visiting Soviet leaders. His trip comes on the heels of visits by several high-ranking Rumanian delegations which probably marked a softening of Prague's policy toward that country.

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Yugoslavia: [The Yugoslav Government will devalue the dinar from 750 to 1200 dinars to the US dollar on 1 July, ]

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[ ] Devaluation, under consideration for about a year, is intended to help overcome the country's foreign trade deficit, which exceeded \$400 million in 1964, and to permit some reduction in foreign trade controls. Additional measures, such as greater restraint in investment and more effective credit controls, will be necessary if the devaluation is to have a lasting effect.]

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4 June 65

12

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Japan: Prime Minister Sato appointed a new cabinet yesterday in a move to place his own stamp on the government in advance of the upper house elections next month. Sato apparently has also sought to check the ambitions of factional chieftains who hope to succeed him. Despite the almost complete turnover involved--only Foreign Minister Shiina was retained--no policy shifts are anticipated.

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Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

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